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CHAPTER ONE
Introduction
The period from 1900 to 1914 is generally accepted to have been one
of great optimism about the progress of man and society.

Most people

believed that the world was steadily improving and that whatever perils
lay in the future could certainly be overcome.

War was felt to be un

likely even though the period had more than its share of imperialism,
nationalism, and increasing armaments .

All of the great technological

inventions only served to remind most people that man had indeed pro
gressed.

Beginning in 1914 this feeling of well-being would be shatter

ed as many of the technological improvements would become instruments of
death and destruction for many millions of men.
Such a shift from an age of optimism to mass destruction on a glo
bal scale had an extremely profound effect upon the intellectuals and
thinkers of the time .

Their writings reflect the disillusionment apparent

in their thought as the world of optimism came tumbling down around them.
Thus the war became a great watershed in the history of thought as the
great technological strides made in the early years of the century became
adapted to warfare.
This thesis will present a survey of the major British thinkers of
the time as they grappled with the problems wrought by the war and the
culmination of those problems in the peace, as well as their effect on
man and the human condition.
1

As the thinkers and the optimists tried to make the post-war world
a better place in which to live , the avengers and the pessimists sought
a harsh punishment for the defeated powers.

Thus the Versailles Treaty

became a focal point for intellectual opposition as the avengers held
out for their sadistic demands.

The quandary became apparent when the

negotiators had to determine what type of treaty they wanted.

The

choice was between the ideal versus the real--juste milieu versus revanche.
The main protagonists at Versailles were Wilson pushing for the idealistic
aims as delineated in the Fourteen Points and Clemenceau, occasionally
backed by Lloyd-George , who opted for harsher punishments to be meted out
against Germany .

The result of this conflict is well known.

Finally, there was the League of Nations .

In its initial conception

it was to be perhaps the answer to the problem of preventing war in the
modern age.

As it turned out, it was nothing more than an impotent body

desirous of peace.

The British intellectuals had very definite views on

what the League should and could be as well as what it actually became .
Thus the purpose of this thesis is to determine the views of certain
British intellectuals and writers by studying their writings and British
journals of opinion.

Since Great Britain in the 1920 ' s housed a great

many brilliant minds, a selection of intellectual figures had to be made
in order to best ascertain what the intellectuals thought concerning the
war, its outcome as portrayed by the Treaty of Versailles, and the League
of Nations.
The first major task is to determine what is meant by the term in
tellectual .

Here two differentiations �ust be made:

the first between

the concepts of intelligence and intellect ; and the second between British

3
and American intellectuals.

Richard Hofstadter in his Anti-Intellec-

tualism in American Life states that in America the term intellect is
frequently used as an epithet while the term intelligence never is.
The concept of intelligence is thus viewed as an esteemed quality while
intellect is seen as ·something else entirely.

To quote Hofstadter

"whereas intelligence seeks to grasp , manipulate, re-order , adjus t , in
tellect examines , ponders, wonders , theorizes , criticizes, imagines".

1

Perhaps it can be said that practicality is the key to the understanding
of the fundamental distinctions between the two .

Intelligence is

viewed , at least in the American culture, as something that can be put
to a practical use.

A person with intellect also has intelligence but

uses the gift in a less than_practical manner .

Hofstadter uses the com-

parison between Thomas A. Edison, the great inventive genius, and Josiah
Willard Gibbs , the man who laid the theoretical foundations for modern
physical chemistry.

While Edison became a legend in his own time , Gibbs

was scarcely recognized.

2

Edison's inventions had practical uses

while Gibbs's accomplishments were in the field of pure research.

This

is the important distinction.
To determine exactly what an intellectual is one must define the
terms involved .

There are several interesting definitions of what the

term intellectual means but two of the best come from Richard Hofstadter
and Arthur M. Schlesinger , Jr .

Hofstadter points out that much of the

work of a culture--that work done by lawyers , doctors, professors , and

!Richard Hofstadter, Anti-Intellectual ism in American Life (New York:
Alfred A. Knop f , 1962), p . 25 .
2 Ibid . , pp. 25-26.

4
engineers--is done by people dependent upon ideas .

This, however, is

not enough to make that work distinctively intellectual.
these professional men live off ideas, not for them. 3
lives for ideas can be termed an intellectual .

To Hofstadter,

Thus the man who

This living for ideas

involves to a certain degree the assumption of the role of skeptic in a
society .

The true intellectual does not accept things as they are but

seeks to change those things that are not as they should be.

George

Bernard Shaw ' s observation that "some men see things as they are and
say why--I dream things that never were and say why not" is the definitive statement about the true role of the intellectual in society, a
person who tries to make things ever better.
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. , holds a view that differs only slightly.
Sctile-

It differs mainly in the seemingly more American pragmatic sens e .
:Singer

·

applies the use of power to the determination of intellectuality.

To Schlesinger, an intellectual is that man who is at home in the world of
ideas as opposed to the man who is at home in the world of power .

4

The

intellectual's inhospitality to the realm of power can be compared to
Hofstadter ' s view of the intellectual ' s role as that of the skeptic .

The

very use of the term skeptic implies one who is somehow outside the mainstream of society .

This does not mean that the intellectual has to be

totally divorced from the world of power, however.

The backbenchers in

the British Parliament are those members of the opposition party who are
skeptical or critical of the direction in which the party in power is

3

Bofstadter , Anti-Intellectualism, pp . 26-27 .

4Arthur M . Schlesinger, Jr . , The Crisis of Confidence (Bosto n :
Boughton-Mifflin , 1969), p . 44.

5
going.

John Maynard Keynes is a good example of an intellectual who

worked in close conjunction with men in power without actually being in
power himself.

This is fairly obvious when one views the treatment of

Germany after the war and then compares that treatment to Keynes ' s opin
ions on the subject.
The second differentiation which must be made concerning the de
finition of intellectuality is the difference between American and
British intellectuals .

American intellectuals historically have been

viewed as being something less than patriotic .

This feeling arose from

the innate skepticism inherent in the thought of the intellectual .
Hofstadter ' s Anti-Intellectualism in American Life is really a history
of the mistreatment and misunderstanding of the American intellectual
by the American public.
An

entirely different situation is apparent in Great Britain.

There

intellectuals are well treated and their opinions are held with some
respec t .

5

Thus a study of their views and opinions lends some insight

into the thinking of the country as a whole.

If such is the case in the

present day there is no reason for believing that the same will not hold
true for the past.

This paper will not attempt to draw conclusions of

this sort but will only present the views held by those selected British
intellectuals .
The following intellectuals have been selected as being representa
tive of intellectual thought in England as a whole in the wartime period .
Those selected--George Bernard Shaw, H . G . Wells , John Maynard Keynes ,

5

Hofstadter, Anti-Intellectualism, p . 424.
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Bertrand Russell, G . K. Chesterton, G . Lowes Dickinson, H . N . Brailsford
and Austin Harrison--fit this image very well .

A perusal of the British

journals of opinion also turns up men who can be considered intellectual s , albeit they are less known than their internationally famous
colleagues already mentioned.
This study is important because it is difficult to understand why
the British intellectuals thought the way they did while their country
was involved in a terrible war.

If, however, the intellectuals are seen

as operating within their own distinct climate of opinion the issue becomes clearer.

Woodrow Wilson, a definite� avis in the American

atmosphere , becomes much easier to understand as part of this British
climate of opinion.
To better understand this term climate of opinion, a definition is
in order.

The term climate of opinion was restored to general usage by

Alfred North Whitehead, the eminent philosopher.

Carl Becker, the

American historian, describes it in his 1932 work The Heavenly City of
the Eighteenth-Century Philosophers.

Stated simply, a climate of opinion

i s an environment in which certain preconceptions, ideas , and ideals are
held as true without proof.

Becker uses the example of Dante and Thomas

Aquinas discussing with us their concepts of a league of nations and
natural law.

Their replies would be unintelligible to us because their

answers would be cast with regard to their medieval climate of opinion.
What is arrived at then is the idea that "whether arguments command assent
or not depends less upon the logic that conveys them than upon the climate
of opinion in which they are sustained" .

6

6carl Becker . The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-Century Philoso
phers (New Haven : Yale University Press , 1932), p . S.

7
The climate of opinion at work in Great Britain during the war was
a holdover from Victorian liberalism.

This liberalism had a certain

amount of idealism involved , as any type of liberalism must for it
stresses what should be but is not.

Bertrand Russell's Non-Conscription

Fellowship during the stormy period of the war is a notable example of
this mixture of liberalism and idealism.

It is extremely idealistic to

be against conscription, and demonstrate against it , while your nation
is fighting for its very life against a very strong enemy .
Thus the intellectuals of Great Britain viewed the war just as
Woodrow Wilson did, as a war to end all wars.

What Wilson suffered at

the hands of Lloyd George, Clem�nceau, and the American Senate the Bri
tish intellectuals also suffered.
it coming while Wilson did not.

The only difference was that they saw
What eventually killed the president

only made the intellectuals' bitterness increase.
Before entering into any discussion of the views of these intellec
tuals it is important to study their backgrounds in order to shed some
light on how they arrived at their conclusions .
George Bernard Shaw was born in Dublin on July 2 6 , 1 856 , the son of
a minor civil servant.
drama.

In 18 9 8 his energies began to be concentrated on

Shortly afterwards he was made drama critic of the Saturday Review .

He became involved with Sidney and Beatrice Webb and became an active
socialis t , thus automatically relegating himself to the role of skeptic in
British society.

Even his plays took on a highly polemical tone.

His works on the war and its aftermath are extremely important for an
understanding of his temper during this perio�.

Common Sense About the

War was published in November 1914 as a supplement to the New Statesman

8
which he had helped found in 19lj,
paper was Shaw ' s What

.!.

The most important work for this

Really Wrote About the War published in 1931

as a compilation of all his wartime writings.
thought is readily apparent here.

The true impact of Shaw's

Although not normally a passionate or

emotional man, Shaw ' s anger and disillusionment is reflected in these
writings .
Herbert George Well s , better known as H . G. Wells , was born on
September 2 1 , 1 866, at Bromley, Kent .

He graduated from London Univer

sity in 1888 and in 1 895 he wrote his first novel The Time Machine.

The

work was an immediate success and so he continued to write works in the
same vein producing, The Wonderful Visit in 1895 ; The Island of Doctor
Moreau in 1896; The Invisible Man in 1897 ; The War of the.Worlds in 189 8 ;
The First Men in the Moon in 1901; and The Food of the Gods in 1904.
Wells ' s talents did not lie only in the realm of science fiction,
however.

He was animated with a passionate concern for man and society.

This was reflected by his turn from fantasy to more realistic comedy ,
usually portraying lower middle-class life.

Drawing upon his own earlier

experiences Wells became the spokesman for the frustrated and the inarti
culate.

He viewed the advent of the war as evidence of the decline of

man and society as a whole.

Man could progress only if he adapted him

self to his changing environment .

The onset of World War I I proved to

Wells that man was not succeeding in adapting.

He died a broken and dis

appointed man on August 1 3 , 1946.
John Maynard Keynes was born June 5, 1883 , at Cambridge where he was
later educated as a mathema�ician.

After studying economics Keynes was

employed by the civil service in India in 1906.

Returning to Cambridge

9
in 1908 as a lecturer he remained there until 1915 when he took a post
in the British treasury.

In 1919 Keynes found himself as a senior

official at Versailles for the peace conference.

He was in total dis-

. agreement with the severity of the reparations demands to be imposed
upon Germany and resigned from his post.

It was at this time that he

wrote The Economic Consequences of the Peace, his most important work.
As a result of his resignation and subsequent book, Keynes became
a public figure, continually embroiled in the economic controversies of
the day .

As an economist Keynes was without equal .

His views in The

Economic Consequences of the Peace were finally followed after ten years
of economic catastrophe in Germany and his later work, The General
Theory o f Employment , Interest and Money (1936) , formed the basis of
Franklin D. Roosevelt ' s economic recovery programs .
When World War II broke out Keynes wrote How To Pay for the War
(1940) which proposed a means .for controlling inflation.

He was an ex

tremely important figure in British wartime finance and negotiated a
large U . S . loan to Great Britain.

He died in.Sussex on April 21, 1946 .

Bertrand Russell was born on May 18 , 18 72 and was destined to be
come a noted philosopher and mathematician.

In some circles his cham

pionship of individual liberty makes him comparable to Voltaire in the
eighteenth century and John Stuart Mill in the nineteenth century.

His

major scholarly work, Principia �athematica, written in collaboration
with Alfred North Whitehead, was published �n three volumes in 1910,
1912, and 191 3 .

It was with the coming o f the war that Russell ' s concern

for individual liberty became apparent.
When war broke out Russell became an active member in the No Con-

10
scription Fellowship as well as becoming a member of the executive
committee of the Union of Democratic Control, the latter being a group
made up of opponents to the war.

Russell was fined one hundred pounds

as the author of a pamphlet criticizing the severity of a two year
sentence meted out to a conscientious obj ector.

When Russell refused

to pay the fine his library was seized and he was later deprived of his
lectureship at the university because of his anti-war activities.

The

governmental harassment continued when Russell was offered a post in
America at Harvard but was refused a passport.
however.

This did not deter him

Russell continued to speak and write against the war and con-

scription until he received a six month j ail sentence in 1918 for a
pacifist article he had written.

In the 1 960 ' s Russell was still de-

monstr ating against war and continued nuclear testing

•

G . Lowes Dickinson was an economist and political scientist who lee.

tured at King ' s College, C ambridge, and the London School of Economics
and Political Science.

He was a pacifist and an early member of the

Union of Democratic Control.

He authored many books dealing with poli-

tical science, history , and philosophy .
Henry Noel Brailsford , an author and j ournalis t , was born in Mirfield, York, in 187 3 .

He was educated at Glasgow University where he

received an M.A. Degree with Philosophical and Classical Honours .

After

graduation Brailsford was the lead-writer successively for the Manchester
Guardian, the Tribune , the Daily News , and Nation.

His other credentials

include membership of the Carnegie International Conunission in the Balkans
in 1913 and he was a member of the executive committee of the Union of
Democratic Control.

11
Gilbert Keith Chesterton was born May 29, 1874, at Campden Hill,
Kensington, and was baptized as a member of the Church of England .
background was typical of a member of the English middle class.

His

His

father was a Liberal with relatively s trong ties to traditionalism.

This

traditionalism along with a dogmatic mind led Chesterton to convert t o
Roman Catholicism.

In politics Chesterton ref erred to himself as a re

luctant Socialist being of the opinion that there were only two choices ,
capitalism or socialism.
At the time of the Boer War Chesterton found himself aligned with
the pacifists as he and they both hated the war .
not a pacifist but was merely pro-Boer.

Chesterton, however , was

This alliance with the cause of

Britain ' s enemy becomes rather difficult t o understand when Chesterton ' s
views

than

on World War I are studied .
did

He took a completely opposite view

most of the intellectuals , defending the British and damning the

Germans unceasingly.

So adept was he at this profession that he was

called to write for Wellington House , the Propaganda Ministry .
ings show why he was chosen for the assignment .

His writ

CHAPTER TWO
Opinions About The War
On June 28 , 1 914 , Gavrilo Princip stepped out of the shadows of a
street in Sarajevo. Serbia, and into the pages of history when he assas
sinated the Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife, the heirs to the
throne of the Austrian Empire,

One month later Austria declared war on

Serbia, followed on August 1 and August 3 by German declarations of war
on Russia and France.

Great Britain entered the war on August 4 and
All the years of diplomatic jockey

World War I was officially under way.

ing , threats and counter-threats were ended.

Now everything was rele

gated to that final instrument of diplomacy--force,
Germany ' s invasion of Belgium is generally accepted as the cause of
Great Britain ' s entry into the war.

The mightiest naval power in the

world could not stand by and watch gallant little Belgium be crushed be
neath the armed might of the German Huns .

And so amid great rej oicing

and celebration, the world went to war .
All British intellectuals were appalled by some aspect of the war.
Gilber t· Keith Chesterton was disgusted by Germany ' s actions while the
rest of the intellectuals dealt with in this paper were appalled by the
war itself .

Chesterton will be dealt with first as he seems to be the

most enigmatic of the intellectuals s tudied in this paper.
Chesterton published his first major work on the war The Barbarism
of Berlin in 1914.

Here he pointed out that one of the key words of the
12

13
war was the word barbarian.

The Prussians had applied it to the Russians;

the Prussians had applied it to the British and the French; now Chesterton
in the name of England was applying it to the Germans and was s triving to
prove that they deserved the title. 7

Ches terton stated that when the

German referred to the Russian as barbarian , he used the term in the
sense of imperfectly civilized and that when the British and French called
the Prussians barbarians the term was used to denote an enemy of civilization.

8

This to Chesterton was a much more telling epithet and one that

the Germans rightly deserved.
According to Chesterton, the Prussian exhibited many characteristics of barbarism.

For example, the Prussian was totally incapable of

reciprocity--the give and take of civilized lif e--because he was intellec
tually incapable of this thought. 9

This Ches terton viewed as the maj or

threat to Europe and the world--the Prussian ' s inability to live as a
societal creature.

The Prussian lacked shyness , that is , the tact, dip-

lomacy, and good taste needed to get along in the world.

Ches terton

succinctly stated that the Prussian was an animal who "eats and makes love
noisily".

10

Since the Prussian did not follow any of the normal customs and mores
of civilized life, it would be f airly obvious that the Prussian would be a
liar too.

Chesterton stated that the Prussian would do anything to achieve

]·
Gilbert Keith Chesterton, The Barbarism of Berlin ( London:
and Co . , Ltd . , 1914), p . 2 6 .
8 1bid . , pp . 28-29 .
9 Ibid . , p . 4 1 .
lO

ibid . , p . 90.

Cassell
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his goals, including lying .
events could have gone .

Chesterton set up a comic calendar of how

It showed the difficulty of a civilized country

when dealing with an unscrupulous barbarian.
July 2 4 :

Germany invades Belgium.

July 2 5 :

England declares war.

July 2 6 :

Germany promises not t o annex Belgium i f England
withdraws from the war .

July 27 :

England withdraws from the war.

July 28:

Germany annexes Belgium.

July 2 9 :

Germany promises not to annex France.
from the war .

July 3 0 :

Germany annexes France.

July 31 :

Germany promises not to annex Engl and .

England declares war.
England withdraws

England declares war .

August 1 : England withdraws from the war.
England. 11

Germany invades

The fact that the Prussians were inveterate liars did not bother
Chesterton so much as their crime of the calculated misuse of the educational system to achieve desired end s .

Not even the professors were immune

to the callous nationalism spewed forth by the government.

They used their

talents to "prove whatever the government wanted them to prove, and the
worst part was that they did it willingly. "
If the English had been on the German side, the German
professors would have noted what irresistible energies had
evolved the Teutons. As the English are on the other side,
the German professors will s ay that these Teutons were not
sufficiently evolved, or they will say that they were not
Teutons . Probably they will say both. But the truth is
that all they call evolution should rather be called evasion.
They tell us they are opening windows of enlightenment and
doors of progress . The truth is that they are breaking up
11 chesterton, Barbarism .£!.. Berlin, pp. 10-11.
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the whole house of human intellect, that they may abscond
in any direction. There is an ominous and almost monstrous
parallel between the position of their over-rated philoso
phers and of their comparatively under-rated soldiers . For
what their professors call roads of progress are really
routes of escape. 12
Chesterton became even more incensed and derogatory toward Germany
in his 1915 work The Appe t ite .£f Tyranny.

This work dealt more with the

defects in the Prussian character, those defects which make the Prussian
a

true barbarian.

Chesterton pointed out that two facts were well-known

in the civilized world .

'UE..fi:rst":is

that Prussia is a second-rate country

and the second is that to any Prussian, Prussia is first-rate and is
ready to allow the rest of the world to take advantage of the glory
that is Prussia .

13

This preoccupation with the Prussian deficiencies in character is
carried over to include all Germans .

Chesterton saw Prussia as the root

of the evil in Germany which lowers all Germans to the level of dogs and
negroes who have no reactions .

14

Because the Germans allowed this P rus-

s ian spirit to overtake them and then wallow in it , all Germans are
stupid and mad, failing in everything except being stupid enough to carry
out their insane culture .

When they fail in this respect they must re-

sort to a brutal obedience, that is , to force their culture on others .

15

Chesterton did admit to some strong points in the Prussian character:

12 chesterton, Barbarism of Berlin, pp. 94-95.
13

Gilbert Keith Chesterton, The Appe t ite of Tyranny (New York:
Mead and Co. , 1915) , p . 95.
1 4 Ibid . , pp . 110-111.
15 Ibid . , pp. 100-101 .

Dodd ,

16
failure in honor, egomania, the itch for tyranny, mental shapelessness ,
and a potential infinity for excuses . 16

Some of the Prussian strong

points were best exhibited in the Imperial proclamations admitting and
justifying atrocities for their fright value.

The admitted purpose of

these atrocities was to terrify civilian populations .

But the Kaiser

was not too proud to write to President Wilson to complain that the
British were using dum-dum bullets. 17
Chesterton realized that Germany presented a very great threat to
the peace of Europe as well as to the peace of the world.

He also knew

that Europe had to be the agent through which the Germans must be stopped.

All the energy of Europe had to be put forth to stop Prussia be-

cause the Prussian would continue to do thing s , as a maniac does , until
he is forced to stop. 18
Chesterton ' s strong religious background is reflected in his third
book on the war , . The Crimes of England, published in 1916.

Here Chester-

ton portrays Germany ' s invasion of Belgium as an anti-religious crusade
begun by the heathen Huns .
The s tatics of non-combatants killed and tortured by
this time only s tun the imagination. But two friends of
my own have been in villages sacked by the Prussian march.
One saw a tabernacle containing the Sacrament patiently
picked out in pattern by shot after shot. The other saw a
rocking-horse and the wooden toys in a nursery laboriously
hacked to pieces. Those two facts together will be enough to
satisfy some o f us of the name o f the spirit that had passed. 1 9-

1 6 chesterton, Appe t ite of Tyranny, pp. 93-94.
17 Ibid . , pp. 43-44.
18 Ibid . , p . 109.
19
G . K . Chesterton, The Crimes of England (New York: John Lane Co . ,
1916) , p . 160.

17

The Prussian infinity for excuses mentioned earlier is discussed in
this work as a result of the sinking of the Lusitania.
not even able to stick to one story.

The Germans were

Chesterton saw five possible

stories the Germans could use to rationalize the ship ' s demise.

First,

the Germans could declare that the Lusitania was a troop-ship subject to
the laws of war.

Secondly, they could state that it was an unlawful

munitions carrier, again subject to sinking by an enemy vessel.

Thirdly ,

the Germans could say that the passengers had been sufficiently warned of
the danger of travelling on ships of the enemy in war-time ( as was indeed the case) .

Fourthly, the Germans could declare that there were

guns on board the Lusitania which were about to be fired at the submarine,
thus making the sinking a clear case of self defens e .

Finally and some-

what s ardonically, Chesterton suggested that the Germans could s ay that
the British s ank the ship in order to make a stronger case for American
entry into the war. 20

Thus Chesterton in effect begins the revisionism

of the causes for American entry into the war by listing the various
propositions used later by historians to explain the reason for the sinking of the Lusitania.
Chesterton defends Great Britai n ' s entry into the war in a letter to
a fictional German professor, Doctor Whirlwind.
in reply to the German charges of British crimes.

The letter was written
Chesterton explains the

real crimes of England.
I have therefore thought it advisable to provide you
with a catalogue of the real crimes of England; and I have
selected them on a principle which cannot fail to interest

20 chesterton, Crimes of England, pp . 12-14 .

18
and please you. On many occasions w e have been very wrong
indeed. We were very wrong indeed when we took part in
preventing Europe from putting a term to the impious
piracies of Frederick the Great
We were very wrong in
deed when we allowed the peaceful king of Denmark to be
robbed in broad daylight by a brigand named Bismarck; and
when we allowed the Prussian swash-bucklers to enslave
and silence the French provinces which they could neither
govern nor persuade
We were very wrong indeed when we
praised the soulless Prussian education and copied the
soulless Prussian laws ,21
•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

Thus Chesterton disregarded any discussion of German innocence in the
war.

In this regard he was definitely odds with George Bernard Shaw.
George Bernard Shaw ' s views on the war differed markedly from those
While Chesterton was dogmatic and tradition-

of Gilbert Keith Chesterton.

al. Shaw was somewhat of a radical and non-conformist .

Shaw did not like

modern capitalist society and so could not wholeheartedly support the
British and French war effor t .

On the other hand the Hohenzollerns were

too militaristic for his taste so Shaw could not really support them
either .

He saw the warring countries as two pirate fleets preparing for

battle.

Since Shaw was on one of the fleets it was important to him

which side won but this in no way altered the fact that both sides were
pirates.

As Shaw himself put it "All the ensigns were Jolly Rogers; but

mine was clearly the one with the Union Jack in the corner".

22

Thus Shaw ' s voice became a voice of reason �peaking out amid a
clamor of unreasonable men.

He believed that the war s.hould not be b ased

on racial or national characteristics since the war was between governments , not people.

Shaw was distressed at the propaganda being put forth

2l chesterton, Crimes of England , pp . 25-26.
22George Bernard Shaw, What .!. Really Wrote About the War (New York:
Brentano ' s , 1914) , p . 2 .

19

by his government portraying the Germans as nothing better than bloodthirsty , rapacious tyrants led by the Junkers who were bent on world
domination.

Shaw pointed out that most Englishmen did not really know

what a Junker was .

To most Englishmen a Junker was a German officer

with bad manners and a nasty habit of cutting down innocent civilians
with his sabre.

This was the definition used by the propaganda people

at Wellington House.

Shaw took his definition from the Encyclopadisches

Worterbuch which defined Junker as a young nobleman, younker, lording,
country squire, or country gentleman.

23

With this definition in mind

Shaw stated that there was not any real difference between a Junker
and an English country gentleman.

Most Englishmen were hard put to be-

lieve this , especially the country gentlemen.
Having pointed out that Germans are no different than Englishmen,
Shav then went ?n to say that the propaganda and legends of crime used
to inf lame the public indignation must be discarded if peace is to be
restored.

The facts must be put in order by separating what is true from

what is false. 24
Since one of the maj or causes of the war according to most Englishmen was the German invasion of neutral Belgium, Shaw discussed this first
as his first strike to show the foolishness and stupidity of the war.
The basis for all of Shaw ' s writings was his belief that the entire concept of neutrality was absurd with international law being as vague as
it was.

According to international law a neutral state is one which does

23 shaw, What ..!_Wrote, p . 20 .
24

Ibid . ,

P•

256 .
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not participate in a war which is in progress and treats the belligerents impartially .

Neutrality gives no assurance that the neutral

will not enter the war nor b e attacked.

25

Great Britain used the

violation of Belgian neutrality as a ploy t o try to get the United
States into the war .

Shaw stated that Great Brit ain had an agreement

to come to the aid of France even if Belgium were not invaded.
was not really the case but Shaw believed it to be so.

This

Thus , Belgium

had to resist the invasion in order to make the imp act on public opinion more forceful .

It would have been more logical, and certainly

more intelligent, to allow the Germans free passage through the country . 26
Since free passage was not forthcoming, Germany found it necessary to
force her way through Belgium.
country in the world.

Thus she was seen as the most evil

To read the British press one would assume that

Shaw, however, did not believe in the ipso facto guilt of

to.be so.

Germany for the war and the destruction of Belgium.

He felt that the

Belgian claims had to b e settled but that the Entente should share some
of the cost of the restoration since it had had a hand in the destruction. 27
Since the conflict was already going on, Shaw had very definite
views on how the war should be waged for the Allied side as well as for
the Entente.

His views on how the war should have been waged are impor-

tant because they set the stage for the peace which Shaw knew had to
25 vernon Van Dyke, International Politics (New York:
Century-Crofts, 1966), p . 280.
26 shaw, What .!. Wrote, p . 98.
27 Ibid , p
•
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come someday.

In order for that peace to be a lasting one the follow

ing provisions had to be carried out.
First , the war had to be pushed vigorously but not so vigorously so
as to crush Germany between the Anglo-French combination and Russia.
The end of the war had to come about as a result of the Anglo-French
forces gaining a hegemony over Germany without the complete destruction
of Germany .

Any victory gained over Germany with Russian aid would

mean the end of western European liberalism.
finite anti-Russian bias here.

Shaw showed a very de

He believed that backward Russia had

no business in the war at all and took great pleasure when Russia,
having embarked on the Russian revolution, withdrew from the war.
Second , Germany had to be driven out of Belgium as a means of re
storing that country ' s territorial integrity.

Since this was the sup

posed reason why Great Britain entered the war, then the war should end
when· Belgium was cleared .
Third, war "as a school of character and a nurse of virtue , " must
be ended after this war. 28

Shaw believed that war had become something

glorious when it should have been something to be feared and avoided.
The celebrations greeting the announcements of the war were enough to
convince Shaw of the viability of this point .
S.haw became more specific , that is he dealt with more specific
points , when he discussed the question of guilt in the war.

He stated

that neither England nor Germany should claim any moral superiority in
negotiations at the end of the war .

28 shaw, What !. Wrote, p . 93.

To Shaw , both sides were equally
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guilty.
Great Britain's basic claim for moral superiority over Germany
rested on the belief that she had fulfilled treaty obligations to come
to the aid of innocent Belgium as she lay helpless before the Hun in
vasion.

Shaw s tated that the case against Germany for the violation of

Belgium was of no moral value to Great Britain because she had allowed
the violation of the Treaty of Paris by Russia ( i . e., the viol ation of
Black Sea neutrality) and the violation of the Treaty of Berlin by Aus
tria ( i . e . , the seizure of Bosnia-Hexzegovina) without resorting to war.
If Great Britain was so interested in the sanctity of treaties , Shaw
aske d, why did she not come out more forcefully when the treaties of
Paris and Berlin were violated?

I t is possible to agree with Shaw on

this point as those who argued most vehemently for an immediate British
response to the German invasion argued on the basis of the alleged
natural inviolability of treaties .

They drastically overstated their

case; Shaw merely responded in like manner .
The fact that the invasion of Belgium was used merely for propaganda
purposes by Great Britain becomes more apparent with the knowledge that
Great Britain would have defended France even without Belgium's invasion.
In fact, the whole issue of Belgian neutrality was illusory .

France and

Great.Britain only stood to gain and Germany to lose if the German at
tack were confined to the heavily fortified Franco-German border.

If

Belgium were invaded, Great Britain an<l France knew they would be in
vited by the Belgians to enter the country.

Thus Belgian neutrality

worked only against Germany as it would be lifted to allow France and
Great Bri tain in.

23
Shaw doubted that the 1839 Treaty of London was valid for use
against Germany in 1 914 as it had been aimed originally at the French
threat to Belgium.

Even if the treaty ' s validity were beyond ques

tion, it is doubtful that its breach would constitute a casus belli. 29
Shaw ' s view on how Germany should have waged the war was most
logical and realis tic.

The German military minds would probably have

been appalled at such a suggestion as Shaw had for them.

According to

Shaw , Germany should have defended herself against Russia alone, not
fearing a rear attack by Great Brit ain and France.

If France had at-

tacked, Great Britain would not have been able to come to her aid as
she would have been the aggressor,

The French government would also

have had a great deal of difficulty convincing its people of the
necessity of a dangerous attack on Germany when Russia had been the
aggressor in the first place . 3 0
Instead Germany attacked France first , only incidentally violating
Belgium on the way in.

This gave the British militarists the excuse

they needed to get involved.

Shaw believed that Germany had made this

stupid move because stupid men were involved.

They viewed the war as

a giant chess game; first France would be swept off the board and then
the turn-about would be made to take care of Russia.

31

But the French

defense was strong enough to check the German advance and history has
recorded the rest of the game.

29 shaw , What ..!_ Wrote, pp . 93-94 .
3 0Ibid. , p . 41.
31 Ibid. , p . 42.
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Shaw not only wrote concerning how things should have been done
but was also in the forefront striving to stop the war before it really
got started.

The 7 November 1914 issue of The Nation printed an open

letter from George Bernard Shaw to the President of the United States. 32
The letter petitioned President Wilson as head of the chief neutral
power to invite the other neutral powers to confer with the United
States to get Britain , France, and Germany out of Belgium and to make
them fight out their quarrel on their own territories .

The letter was

a cogent appeal to a reasonable man to help Europe out of a most un
reasonable time.
Shaw saw how the ancient rules of war had changed under advancing
technology.

Men now fought and died to gain a few hundre� yards of

worthless devastated ground which would be recaptured the next day by
the enemy .

Neutrality was a thing of the pas t ; civilians had become

tot�lly involved in the war effort , both as economic entities and as
casualties.

Shaw realized that this war was not the end of an era but

the beginning and preview of worse terrors to come.

Pessimistically

Shaw wrote, "the next war , if permitted to occur, will be no 'sport of
kings , ' no game of chance played with live soldiers and won by charging
them into dead ones, but a scientific attempt to destroy cities and kill
civilians . 11

33

Twenty-one years later this prophecy was fulfilled .

Perhaps the most visionary of the intellectuals was Herbert George
Wells .

For example, he wrote in 1916 that there would be no conclusive

32 see Appendix for full text of letter.
33 shaw, What ..! Wrote, p . 2 7 3 .
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end to the war with a triumphal entry into London , Paris, Berlin, or
Moscow but a negotiated peace between shattered powers.
an excellent assumption to be made as early as 1916.
that the assumption never became reality.

34

This was

It is too bad

True, there were no trium-

phal entries into any major city but neither was there a negotiated
peace.

What occurred was a dictated peace after a war in which there

was no clear cut defeat for the German forces .
but there was no final crushing defea t .

They were retreating

Instead the stab-in-the-back

legend received fertile soil in which to grow.

It would flower under

Adolph Hitler.
Wells had hoped that a principle of nationalities would develop in
Europe , ultimately becoming an arrangement of nationalities, a type of
"United States ," which would lessen interstate rivalries .

He based

this concept on the Swiss canton system wherein each canton has its own
rel�gion and culture but is coalesced with the other cantons into a
federation.

35

Wells hoped that such a canton system would develop in

Europe because he was distressed by the emphasis being placed by his
countrymen on the evil of the Germans .

Wells had worked for a time in

Wellington House , the British propaganda ministry , as head of the German
section.

He resigned on July 1 7 , 1918 voicing his dissatisfaction with

the tone of the propaganda being disseminated.

Wells wanted only the

overthrow of the German militarists; the Propaganda Ministry wanted, at
least as seen in their propaganda, the extermination of the German

34H . G . Wells, What
� C�ming ?
pp. 35-36 .
35 rbid . , pp. 193-194 .

(New ·� f ork:

The Macmillan Co . , 1916_),
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race.

36

To Wells the war was not one against the German race but one

against the Hohenzollern dynasty.
Let us not be blinded by the pass ions of war into
confusing a people with its government and the artif icial
Kultur of a brief century. There is a Germany , great
and civilised , a decent and admirable people, masked by
Imperialism, blinded by the vanity of the easy victories
of half a century ago , wrapped in illusion. 37
Wells then became the patriot again.

While admitting that Germany

was hated because of the Hohenzollerns , he stated that economic warfare
would continue as long as every German identified with the Hohenzollern
dreams of empire. 38

Thus although the war was being waged by the Hohen-

zollerns it was the average German citizen who had to be killed and defeated on the field of battle if the Allies were to be victorious .

In

effect then, Wells was disturbed by the intensity of the race hatred
spewing forth from Wellington Hous e .

He did realize that some passions

had to be stirred up if the average Englislunan was to go forth to murder
his fellow man but his reasonableness and intellect had been assaulted
by the rabid tone of the propaganda.
The reasonableness of Wells's arguments became more apparent when
he discussed the "war crimes" of the Germans .

He believed that if a just

peace were to be achieved acts like the invasion of Belgium and the
sinking of the Lusitania would have to be put into a special category of
symptoms of war calling for special punishments or reparations.

Above

all they must not be made a part of the ultimate peace settlement as they

36George G . Bruntz, Allied Propa anda and the Collapse � the German
g
Empire in 1918 (California: Stanford University Press , 1938), pp. 27-28.
37 well s , What

�

Comin g? , p . 197 .

38 Ibid . , p p . 198-200.
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would only exacerbate feelings .

39

Wells , with his scientific background and knowledge of the mechanics of modern warfare , realized the terrible potential of mechanized
warfare as well as the fact that the rules of war were now subject to
drastic revision.

The actions of the submarines helped usher in this

new age as tl2submarine's effectiveness was limited unless surprise
could be achieved .

Wells knew that war had gone beyond the realm of

the old rules of cruiser warfare where the ship was stopped and warned
before being sunk .
This viewpoint was diametrically the opposite of that held by
Woodrow Wilson who believed that the nineteenth-century rules of war
had to be observed .

Wells stated that this merely showed the naivete

of the Americans concerning the war .
Some /Americans ! seemed to be under the impression
that, war or no war:- an American tourist had a perfect
right to travel about in the Vosges or up and down the
Rhine just as he saw f i t . They thought he had just to
wave a little American flag, and the referee would blow
a whistle and hold up the battle until he had got by
safely. 40
When this is compared to Wilson's statements , especially those concerning
neutral travel on the high seas as a right, Wells's point is well made.
Wells ' s comprehens ion of the horrors of modern warfare made him
able to understand and view more objectively the actions of Germany .
This objectivity and understanding disappeared when he wrote as an historian.

Throughout his Outline of History.the tone is anti-militaristic .

39a . G . Wells , Italy, France and Britain at War (Chicago :
Donohue and Co. , 1917), p . 263 .
40H . G . Wells , What Is Comin ? , p . 216.
g

M.A.
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Wells did not like military men and this was reflected by his disparaging
remarks about them.

Seeing Prussia as the most militarized state in

Europe, Wells's venom reached its highest level.
Prussianized Germany was at once the newest and the
most antiquated thing in Western Europe . She was the
best and the wickedest state of her time . 41
The Germans were great because they had come so far in a relatively short
time .

It was the means they used which Wells objected t o .

Wells stated

that no other modern state sinned so greatly against education as did
Germany .

The excesses of patriotic vanity were engendered by the educa-

tional system of Germany .

Teachers and professors who did not preach the

42
superiority of the Germans were "doomed to failure and obscurity11•
Thus the educational system had been subverted for nationalistic end s .
This led t o a stifling of the creative imagination i n all areas .
was most readily apparent in the realm of military science .

This

Wells hit

this area especially hard because of his hatred of military men in
general.

With all the new weapons and inventions of war, military science

was far out of date at the onset of the great war .

Wells stated that the

Schlief fen Plan was the best example of the out-of-date tactics employed
by the Germans .

The Schlieffen Plan, designed to knock France out firs t ,

was based on an extremely strong right flank which would sweep rapidly
through Belgium and northern France to out-flank the French armies .

This

plan, which was used in the great war , had been made some twenty years
before that war occurred .

I t completely ignored the political conse-

41H . G . Wells, The Outline of History: Bein
g� Plain History of Life
and Mankind (New York: Macmillan and Co . , 1921), volume II , p . 4 7 9 .
4

2wells,
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quences which would b e wrought by the violation of Belgian neutrality
as well as the limits placed on the speed of the advance by modern artillery and machine-gun fire.

This, to Wells , was what made the war

even more terrible, the lack of imagination of the military men. 4 3
When the war came the Schlieff en Plan failed because Graf Helmuth von
Moltke, Schlieffen ' s successor, did not keep the right flank strong
enough to finish the job.
Regarding the alleged atrocities committed by the Germans in
Belgium, Wells believed that too great a fuss was being made.

He

s tated that the real atrocity was the invasion itself and that Great
Britain had had to enter the war once that violation was accomplished .

44

Over all, Wells did not see the war as being caused by some inherently evil monsters called Germans .

The war had been visibly appro-

aching in 1913 but there was neither the will nor the understanding to
prevent i�.

Most of the population viewed the war as a new excitement

to be indulged in.

The horror of what the war turned out to be was not

real to the moods of the time. 45
Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson was another of the intellectuals who
wrote on the causes of the war but he did it from the point of view of
the political scientist.

Dickinson traced the war to the Franco-

Prussian rivalry engendered by the war of 1870 and the Anglo-German

43wells, Outline � History, p . 513.
44 Ibid . , pp. 511-512.
45Ibid . , p . 572.
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rivalry to Germany' s desire for a strong navy which challenged Great
Britain ' s role as mistress of the seas. 46

These thing s , however ,

merely established the sides for the war; they did not directly cause
the war .

Dickinson believed that the invasion of Belgium was not even

the cause of the war but only a consequence of i t .

Once Germany was

committed to war there was really no military alternative for her but
to go through Belgium to get to France .

Edward Grey had intimated

that England would defend France regardless.

Thus i t made no difference

to Germany if Belgium were invaded since Great Britain would enter the
war anyway .

What the invasion did do was to strengthen British public

opinion against Germany , and this did hurt the Germans.

Through the

efforts of Wellington House and its effective use ot propaganda, th�
war became a glorious crusade against the Hun. 47

It would not seem so

glorious when those soldiers so imbued with the spirit of the salyation
.

of Belgium reached the front.

.
Dickinson saw the war as a quest for security with Germany feeling

the need for a large navy and Great Britain seeing this as a direct
threat to her power .

From this point of view the fever rapidly accel-

erated until full scale war was in progress .

Dickinson doubted that

true peace could be achieved or maintained if the enemy was completely
crushed.

As an example he cited the case of Prussia after Jena and

its subsequent rise to powe r .

France too had suffered a humiliating

def eat at the hands of Prussia in 1871 but had risen again to great
46Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson, War : Its Nature , Cause and Cure
(London: G . Allen and Unwin, Ltd. , 1923), pp . 58-59.
47 Ibid. , p . 74.
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power status. 48

The desire for revenge used as a means of pulling a

country up again was too strong to be taken lightly .
was prophetic to a certain degree.

Thus Dickinson

While Germany was not actually

crushed on the field of battle, the Treaty of Versailles was certainly
a

crushing and humiliating blow.

Germany ' s rise and subsequent revenge

on the perpetrators of that treaty is only too well known .
If the espousal of minority viewpoints or unpopular stands in any
way constitutes intellectuality, Bertrand Russell s tands preeminent
among thinkers of the twentieth century.

His views were such that dur-

ing World War I he was actually considered a dangerous individual by
his government and was forbidden by government order entry into any
restricted area. 49

In World War I England ' s restricted area was any

territory near the sea, often including whole counties .

Perhaps the

government feared that if Russell got too near the sea he might s ignal
the enemy for some treasonable purpose.

�e government ' s harassment

of Russell became so intense that his passport was revoked .

Thus he

could not even earn a living as he had to forego a position a t Harvard
since he had no passport .

This bothered Russell greatly because it

meant that Britain, his "free" homeland was depriving him of his physical liberty.
The beginning of the war instituted in Russell a sort of mental
rejuvenation causing him t o discard his old prejudices and to re-think

48Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson, The Choice Before Us (G. Allen and
Unwin, Ltd . , 1917 ) , p . 257 .
49Bertrand Russell, Justice in War Time (Chicago :
lishing Co . , 1918 ) , p . v .
-

--

Open Court Pub-

32
certain fundamental questions .

He did not believe that Europe was

insane enough to go to war but he was realistic enough to know that if
war came England would be involved .

so

He hoped that England would re-

main neutral but realized that this was impossible when he saw the response of the populace to the war.

Russell had believed , as did most

pacifists , that wars were forced on unwilling populations by Machia
vellian governments. 51

The overwhelmingly j oyful response of the

average person to the coming of the war caused Russell to re-think his
position.

He came to view the statesmen as the true harbingers of the

war as they were the ones who made the decisions which sent young men
to their slaughter .

The fact that the young men Qid not see� to .D}ind

going to war meant that the statesmen merely· loosed popular iorces held
within the population.
toward the s tatesmen.
several weeks

I

This , however , did not mitigate Russell ' s ire
Even though a paci.fist Russ.ell wrote:

felt that if

r

"Fo�

should happen to �eet Asquith. or Gre¥

should be unable to refrain from murder . 11

52

t

Russell ' s low opinion of

the statesmen of the time was not confined only to t�e British variety.
He expressed indignation over the fact tha.t no statesman was thinking of
the good of all.
Is there no statesman who can think in terms of
Europe, not only of separate nations? Is our own civi
lisation a thing of no account to all our rulers? 53

50Bertrand Russell, The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell (Boston:
Little, Brown and Co. , 1969} , vol. I I , p . 3 .
5 1 Ibid . , pp . 3-4 .
52 Ibid. , p . 7 .
53Russell, Justice in War Time , p . 117.
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Although he was disturbed by the fact that Great Britain would go to
war , Russell was tortured by his own patriotism .

As a pacifist he ab-

horred war but his love of country made him desire the def eat of Germany .

However, he did protest the propaganda of Great Britain as it

sickened him as much as the slaughter did.
As a lover of truth, the national propaganda of all
the belligerent nations sickened me . As a lover of
civilization, the relent to barbarism appalled me. 54
Other protests took other forms .

One of these was an open letter

to President Wilson written in 1915 which depicted Russell's belief
that European civilization was in danger of complete and utter destruction unless the president would negotiate the end of the war .
Russell pointed out that he had no office which would have lent authority to his plea but could only write as one concerned with reason and
mercy.

SS

The theme of the war threatening to put an end to civilization
appeared again in Russell's writings .

He believed that civilization

would be threatened when war became corranon-place thus making men callous
to its effects.

56

He believed that most men saw the horror of war and

realized the evil it caused but that excessive nationalism and chauvinism caused men to lose their perspective when viewing war.
War is felt to be the ultimate test of :a nation ' s
manhood, the ultimate proof of its vigour and of its

54Russell, Autobiography, p . 7 .
55 Ibid . , pp . 22-26 .
56Russell , Justice in War Time , p . 107 .
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right to exis t . 57
The problem was that men viewed war as evil when other nations were involved in it .

Then it was possible to look at the refugees , the dead,

the wounded , and the maimed as casualties of some useless adventur e .
However , when one ' s own nation was involved , war became a necessity,
albeit an evil necessity, but a necessity all the same to prove to the
world that that country was strong and vital.

Survival of the fittest

became the key to the situation and the evils and inhumanity of war were
pushed aside.
On August 1 2 , 1914, Russell wrote a letter to the Londo n Nation
which was published on 15 August.

The letter protested Great Britai n ' s

share i n the destruction o f Germany.

Russell stated that certain

things should always remain constant; for example , if an Englishman had
killed a German one month before, he would be hanged as a murderer.
Now, if that Englishman killed a Gennan, he would be seen as a patriot
and would be decorated as a hero .

The blame for this unwholesome state

of affairs lay with the statesme n , especially the British statesme n ,
who were bent on war regardless of Germany ' s actions .

Russell was re-

£erring specifically to Edward Grey ' s reply to the German amb assador
stating that he could not s ay that Great Britain would remain neutral if
Belgium were not violated .
could be elicited from Grey.

No st atements on conditions for neutrality
As a result Russell could only say:

I cannot resist the conclusion that the Government
has f ailed in its duty to the nation by not revealing
long-standing arrangements with the French , until, at

57 Russell , Justice in War Time , p . 61.
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the last moment , it made them the basis of an appeal
to honor ; that it has failed in its duty to Europe by
not declaring its attitude at the beginning of the crisis·;
and that it has failed in its duty to humanity by not in
forming Germany of conditions which would insure its non
participation in a war which, whatever its outcome, must
cause untold hardship and the loss of many thousands of
our bravest and noblest citizens . SB
Russell ' s protests took other forms as well.

The most visual was

his six month imprisomnent for writing an article for The Tribunal , a
paper published by the No Conscription Fellowship .

In the article

Russell stated that American soldiers would be used as strike breakers
in England to avert a labor crisis.

This statement was the last straw
He

for the British government and so Russell was packed off to prison.
did not find prison life horrifying , rather he said it was quite
agreeable.

He was allowed to read, do some writing , and was able to

smuggle out certain other letters and pamphlets in some rather ingen
ious ways . 59

Actually Russell ' s imprisonment merely served to increase

his stature among opponents of the war as it showed the British government in its most spiteful state.
As stated earlier Russell was concerned because England , his "free"
country, had seen fit to deprive him of his livelihood and his freedom.
It was the injustice of the government that really bothered him, not
only "the government ' s injustice toward him but also that inj ustice meted
out to other people.

The government ' s injustice toward the masses was

demonstrated by the fact that it chose to participate in the war .
itself was the greatest of all evils.

Russell s tated that "sympathy

58Russell , Autobiography, pp . 42-25 .
59 rbid. , p . 30.
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with Belgium should make us hate war rather than Germany" . 60

On a

less esoteric level war visited more specific evils on humanity.
The first, and one of the worst, evils was the factthat a large
number of young men, the most f i t , were killed , maimed , or driven mad .
Here was the beginning of the "lost generation" theme so prevalent in
the 192 0 ' s .

The cream o f European youth was destroyed and for what?

The tragedies inflicted on non-combatants were the second great
evil brought about by the war .

World War I was the first war which

really dislocated the lives of non-combatant s , socially, economically,
culturally, and far too often physically.
Another evil caused by the war was the slowing of economic pro
gres s .

As economic progress was slowed s o was social progress.

To

the middle class person economic progress was a foregone conclusion but
a t the lower levels of the social and economic strata it was not.

With

out a certain amount of economic progress at these levels , social and
spiritual progress was impossible .

The question became one of how could

people be expected to develop if they were unable to prosper economi
cally?

This was Russell ' s lead-in to a discussion of socialism which he

believed was the sanest force in Eruope because of its internationalism
and ability to pr �serve a certain degree of humanity.
_

Russell did not

mention the fact that the various socialist parties killed international
ism by voting war credits to their respective governments thus getting
caught up in the tide of public opinion which heralded the beginning of
the war .

60Russell, Justice in War Time , p . 24.
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The worst tragedy engendered by the war was the hatred and injustice i t caused .

Russell believed that the war was due to blindness to

the comity of mankind .

It was not a physical necessity which caused

men to fight but their own stupidity and chauvinism.

Russell thus

viewed human nature as basically good but somewhat lacking when it
came to acting in its own best interest s .

61

Russell did not confine his views only to the rather philosophical
topics already mentioned .

On a more specific level , he did not believe

that any of the combatants were justified in the war sinc e , in his opin
ion, war was a crime under all circumstances.

62

All the talk about

Great Britain ' s coming to the defense of neutral Belgium was just so
much pap for public opinion.

Belgium was not the determining factor

for Britain ' s entry into the war but the threat to France was .

Russell

agreed that the German invasion of Belgium mustered British public
opinion because:
Belgium showed Germany at its worst , but it did not
show us at our best. It gave Germany an occasion for
brutal violence � it gave our Foreign Office an occasion
for hypocrisy. 6.J
The fact that Belgium was not the major factor in the decision for war
can be seen through a study of history.
ween France and Germany .

In 1887 there was tension bet-

War was expected and the likelihood of Germans

marching through Belgium was admitted.

The British newspapers, as re-

flectors of public opinion, concluded that the obligation to Belgium

61
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did not require going to war .

In 1914 the British obligation to Bel-

gium was stated as resting entirely on the 1839 Treaty of London which
had guaranteed Belgian neutrality.

If Belgium were so importan t , why

was England ready to enter a conflict in 1914 but not in 1887?

Russell

viewed it simply as a . change in the British view of British interests.

64

What happened was that the Anglo-German rivalry came to a head in
1914.

Prior to this Great Britain had acted with hostility toward Ger

many in the Morocco crisis.

65

In fact , it can be said that the policy
.

of the Entente encouraged the warlike elements in Germany by showing
that the Entente was ready for war . 66

The crises were averted only at

the last moment but the underlying tension and hostility was still present.

64
65

1914 simply brought it into the open.

Russell, Justice in War Time , p . 124.
Ibid . , p . 193.

6 6Ibid . , p . 199 .

CHAPTER THREE
Peace Conference and Treatment of Germany
What happened at Versailles was very different from what the intellectuals believed necessary to achieve a just peac e .

We will see

what suggestions were given by the intellectuals as they voiced their
hopes for the future of Europe and the world .

Next we will see the

peace as it actually turned out as well as the opinions in favor of
and against the treaty.

Lastly we will study the reparations ques-

tion as it clearly affected Germany more than anything else in the
treaty .
George Bernard Shaw ' s views , especially those expressed in his
"Peace Conference Hint s , " shows best the intellectual ' s s tand on the
peace .

He believed that the map of Europe had to be redrawn to make

sure that war could not easily occur again.

This redrawing would not

be done by some omnipotent and omniscient Inquiry but would occur as
a result of plebiscites to determine the will of the people involved .
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Another way in which the peace could be re-established and maintained was to establish a hegemony of peace involving Germany , France ,
and Great Britain.

This hegemony would make a repeat of 1914 impossible

as Germany and France would be allied .

World War I occurred when

Germany and France became involved in a Russian-Aus trian dispute.
67 George Bernard Shaw. What
Brentano ' s , 1931) , p p . 65-66.
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68 tbid . , pp . 68-69 .
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Shaw was not so much a believer in the balance of power concept to
maintain peace as he was a supporter of ideology as the basis for
the post-wa� world .

He believed that it was absurd that England should

have joined Russia in destroying Germany when the Russian Tsarist
government was the enemy of every English liberty.

69

Germany was

closer to England in ideology than Russia was and so Germany must be
saved .

Shaw ' s position was not unlike Winston Churchill ' s after World

War II as both believed Germany must remain strong as a buffer against
Russia .

To this end , Shaw stated the Great Britain's desire for re-

venge against Germany should be reconsidered .

The blockade alone had

caused 763,000 Germans to die of starvation for no other reason than
revenge . 70

This was not the way to achieve peace and stability.

The

militarists, however, wanted Germany ''bled white" and the blockade was
a good way of doing this .
who felt this way .

Shaw had a suggestion for his countrymen

Rather than sinking Germany ' s fleet or annexing

her colonies it would be better to take care of her numbers.

The sol-

dier it took seconds to kill, i t took nine months of travail for a
woman to breed and eighteen years to ripen.

Thus to insure that Germany

could never field an army again, simply kill seventy-five percent of all
.
71
G�rman women under sixty years of age.
This very effectively showed
how Shaw viewed the continued blockade of Germany .

He believed that

militarism must not be seen as a peculiarly Prussian institution.
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George Bernard Shaw.
Brentano ' s , 1931) , p . 7 0 .
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must be admitted that Great Britain's conduct of the war was no better
than Germany ' s . 72
Shaw delineated some very specific points concerning what should
be accepted before any of the parties even sat down at Versailles.
{l )

All parties should enter Paris on equal terms morally re-

garding the planning and preparation for the war since selfpreservation was the basis for all actions .
(2 )

Since a naval blockade decided the war , it mus t be admitted

that Great Britain has a power no other country has--the power
of starvation.
{3)

The United States feels that she must have a fleet capable

of coping with any existing armament unless the League can change
the armament situation.
(4 )

Since Germany's desire for a strong fleet led to World War

I , the US. need for a fleet is the first step toward the next war
unless the League becomes a reality .

(5)

The League must be a combination of states with settled

responsible governments of the democratic typ e .

(6)

Governments of the North American republic type should be

eligible for League membership without question.

Monarchies must

satisfy the League that they are responsible.
(7 )

Germany cannot be admitted until her government is settled

but peace cannot be insured unless Germany is admitted .

(8)
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The campaign of hatred against Germany must be ended .

George Bernard Shaw.
Brentano's, 1931) , p . 95.
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(9)

Disa rmament is possible but delusive .

balance and morally control arms.

The League must

Making war physically im-

possible cannot be done .
(10)

There should be no neutrality as it is impossible to main-

tain.
(11)

Wilson by intellectual and moral superiority must make certain

his views predominate .
world wituation.

He must awaken America to the gravity of the

73

Shaw was not the only intellectual to be concerned with the fate of
the world after the war .

Austin Harrison edited The English Review and

wrote articles in such journals as Nineteenth Century, Contemporary,
National Review, Fortnightly, and North American Review

•

.

Born March 27 ,

1873, �rrison was educated at the Universities of Lausanne , Marburg,
and Berlin.

Besides articles, he authored several books The Pan-

Germanic Doctrine, England and Germany, and The Kaiser's War.
Harrison wrote in the English Review an article entitled "Covenant
or Tilsit?" in which he stated that the powers meeting in Paris had a
decision to make regarding what the peace would b e .

He pointed out that

as a result of the conference the League of Nations would become the
gi;eatest world power because it would control the "hunger-points" of
Europe .

It just so happened that these "hunge-r-points" were also the

points of honour of the belligerent nations .

Thus we would still have

the German-Polish rivalry at Danzig , Italian-Jugo-Slav rivalry at
Fiume , Turk versus Russian at Constantinople, and German versus French-
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man in the Saar.

74

Food is the key to the League ' s power as the League

deprives the defeated powers of the economic resources necessary for
recovery.

The League then becomes the punisher of the defeated powers ,

thus taking over the role of the victorious powers.
League was brought into being according to Harrison.

This is why the
No true princi-

ples caused the Covenant to evolve and it will not solve the problems
which caused the war.
The root points of war--colour, religion, economics,
nationality--remain untouched. They will remain un
solved. 75
In another article entitled "Peace or War?" Harrison pointed out
the difficulty involved in achieving a certain degree of fairness at
Versailles.

A subtle criticism of Wilso n ' s idealism was �he point

here.
We dare not, for instance , fight for nationality
and · at the same time debar the Germans from claiming
nationality. 76
The problems lay. in the fact that Wilson believed that wars could
be halted in Europe once all nationalities were allowed to join their
homelands.

He did not take into account the fact that Great Britain

and France desired the punishment of Germany .
was denied the Germans.

Thus self determination

In 1936 Hitler was very careful to state that

he was merely following the principles of self determination in annexing
Austria.

Simply stated , Wilson ' s idealistic pronouncements on self
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determination were used to start ·World War II .
When discussing what the peace turned out to b e one must be aware
of the personalities involved at the peace conference .

The British

intellectuals were well aware of the differences in personalities of
the characters at Ver·sailles as well as the problems those differences
would cause .
H . G . Wells stated that the problems o f the conference began with
the election of Clemenceau as its president .

As a professional pat-

riot, Clemenceau sounded a note of revenge when the true business of
the conference should have been the future o f mankind..

77

When such a

man as this came up against a man like Woodrow Wilson, the result had
to be the breaking of one of them;

According to Shaw, Wilson came to

Europe to stand for Republicanism.

This was his mission.

78

The pro-

blem was that when he got to Paris, he went war mad and began to talk
of war guilt like any j ingo .
him.

The strain of peace had finally broken

79
All of this occurred because of fundamental errors which Wilson

fell prey to .

Wells describes them in his Outline .£1 History.

The ma-

jor error was Wilson ' s own conduct of the war and negotiation of the
peace.

He made the whole affair a personal vendetta:

Wilson's peace, even in his own mind.
not even have come to Paris.

the peace became

Wells believed that Wilson should

By doing so , he became overly involved in

77
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the proceedings when he could have stayed home and more strongly exercised the force of moral principle. 80
.

Wells stated that Wilson compounded the blunder of coming to
Paris because he was not expert in the intricacies of European power
politics.

Wilson ' s list of books showed a mind directed exclusively

to American history and politics.
He was mentally the new thing in history, negligent
of and rather ignorant of fhe older things out of which
his new world had arisen. 8
Besides not understanding European politics ve+y well , Wilson ' s
over-all naivete rather limited his effectivenes s .

At Paris h e was

dealing with hardened realistic politicians who often grew tired of
Wilson' s idealistic attitude.

Clemenceau expressed his disdain for

Wilson by saying that the President "talked like Jesus Christ" and that
with his Fourteen Points Wilson was "worse" than God, "Le bon Dieu only
had ten. iiSZ
Although Wells �elieved that there were great differences between
Clemenceau and Wilson, Shaw stated that the differences were not so
great.

A debate in the French chamber which began on 27 December showed

this.
li.ilson--1£ the future had nothing for us hut a new
attempt to keep the world at right poise by a balance
of power, the United States would take no interest,
because she will join no combination of power which is
not a combination of all of us . 83
8 0walls, The Outline � History, pp . 550-551 .
81 Ibid . ,

PP•

543-54 4 .

8 2 rbid . , p . 556.
83 shaw, What ..!.. Really Wrote About the War , p . 292.
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�t at ed for his side:

Clem��c@a�

an old sy�tem, the balance of power , to
remain faithful. This system seems to be now
�ondemneg ; �ut if such a balance of power had preceded
the wa� , and if Britain, America, France, and Italy
hid @�reed to say that whoever attacked one of them
W@Yld pe �ttacking the whole world, this atrocious war
wo�ld not have taken place. This system of alliance
@hell pe my guiding thought at the Conference.
I
'h�ll m�ke all possible sacrifices to this end. 84
There i$

whi�h

l

i@§eRti�lly
to the

e�d@ if

feient way o!

Wilson and Clemenceau were in agreement, at least as

�Qt

in means .

Both men �anted peace but each had a dif-

maintaining it--Wilson through the League of Nations and

Clemence�u

thfough the balance of power against Germany .

ee�tie� of

the tea�ue as a force to be reckoned with by any nation con-

templetini w�r

w�s the same idea Clemenceau held when he stated that
construed as an attack upon the whole world.

any att3�� WQqlg �e
f@@�lt i� b�th

e0�ei

Jo�tn3li�ti�

The

would be the same.

Qpinion of the treaty of peace was mixed in its re-

3�tiQfi tQ the te:rm$
ft3Ve elfe�dy

Wilson' s con-

• .

Austin Harrison, an opponent of revanche as we

�een, wrote that :

The conditions of peace which are to be dictated
have never been equalled in history. In
the�r meticulous laceration, their continuous string. ency , the�r throttle-hold on the vitals of a nation,
they ��e without a precedent ; and if there is a certainty,
it i$ th�t the 'Wilson' peace, once so feared by extre
m��ts, will go down to posterity as the most comprehensive
do�qment Q f punishment on record. a s
to Ge�e�Y

�rri�on doubted that the treaty with its harsh treatment of Germany
W'!S

the be$t way of making the world "safe for democracy" as was origin-

8 4 Shaw, �at !. Really Wrote About the War, p . 292.
S�H�rr:i,son, "Covenant or Tilsit ? " , p . 531.
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ally intended. 8 6

All the talk of new. de-qiocracies. and aelf determina-

tion was put aside when it came to Germany .

Thus the idealism of

Wilson ' s Fourteen Points was used only when the Allies, most especially
France, saw fit and not applied in the same manner to Germany .
While most of the intellectuals were concerned with certain
general matters , John Maynard Keynes concerned himself with the very specific problem of reparations as it applied at Versailles .
extremely interesting character.

Keynes was an

A man of urbanity and wit , he criti-

cized the important figures assembled at Versailles .

Some examples

of Keynes ' s opinions on general topics will suffice to show his
style.

Of the "negotiating" of the Versailles Treaty he said "there

are few episodes in history which posterity will have less reason to
condone. 11

87

Concerning the British "Khaki" election of December

1918 Keynes stated:

"a vote for a Coalition candidate meant the Cru-

cif ixion of the Anti-Christ and the assumption by Germany of the British
National Debt . 1188

His views on President Wilson are well enough known

that they do not bear repeating here, but Keynes ' s opinion of the treaty
generally and the League of Nations in P?rticular is extremely interesting .

He viewed President Wilson and General Smuts as firm believers in

t�e League as a force to be involved in the revision of the treaty.
Keynes believed that Articles V and X (the unanimity and collective se86Austin Harrison, "The Throttle-hold", English Review , XXVIII..
(Jan. -June 1919) , 5 3 9 .
87
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York : Harcourt , Brace, and Howe , 1920) , p . 1 45 .
88Keynes , Economic Consequences, p. 144.
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curity clauses) made the League an instrument for the preservation of
8
the status quo rather than an instrument for progres s . 9

In this view

Keynes was siding with such men as Herbert Croly, Walter Weyl, and
Walter Lippmann, the editors of The New Renublic, who felt that the
League of Nations would only make a bad situation worse.

Generally

the supporters of the League believed that it would operate by the influence of public opinion throughout the world.

Keynes hoped that

this would be the case but he felt that trained European diplomats
would use the League to obstruct and delay necessary change and pro
gress . 9 0
Keynes was temporarily attached t o the British Treasury during the
war and was the official representative of that department at the Paris
Peace Conference until June 7 , 1919 .

He resigned when he b ecame aware

of the fact that the treaty was incapable of being modified.

Keynes

believed that the attempt to force Germany to pay general war costs was
politically unwise and could only lead to disaster in the economic
realm.

This would occur because the basic problems of Europe were

economic, not political or social.

The difficulties were enhanced be-

cause neither Wilson nor Lloyd George were aware of the economic ramif i91
.
cations of their proposed s o1 utions
.

Keynes believed that resignation

was the only way he could make his views apparent .

In the cabinet sys-

tem of Great Britain this was a wise and logical step which had its intended effect of alerting the public to what was occurring at Versailles .
89Keynes, Economic Consequences , pp .
257-260.
9 °Keynes , Economic Consequences , p . 259 .
9 1 Ibid . , p . 146 .
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Keynes ' s o'W'n estimate o f a reasonable reparations payment would
have set a sum of 1 0 , 000,000, 000 dollars which Germany would have to
pay.

His estimate of what the Allies and Associated powers were de-

manding as reparations from Germany ran as follows :
British Empire
France
Italy
Others (including U . S . )
Total

7 , 00 0 , 00 0 , 000
1 2 , 00 0 , 00 0 , 000
2 , 500 , 00 0 , 000
3 , 500 , 00 0 , 000
$ 25 , 00 0 , 000 , 000 92

$

Keynes believed that the treaty contained nothing concerning the
economic rehabilitation of Europe.
the future pessimistically . 9 3

Thus he could do nothing but view

He blamed the representatives of the

United States for this draw-back as they had no concrete proposals to
alleviate the sufferings of Europe. 94

The best way to alleviate the

sufferings of Europe, Keynes felt , was by a cancellation of war debts
by the United States.

The only problem was that this was an unthinkable

idea for most Americans .

Keynes believed , however , that even an abate

ment of part of the debt would have helped greatly . 95
The economic problems could have been solved before the conference
if the United States and Great Britain could have agreed upo� the following points :
(1) cancellation of all inter-Allied debt s .
(2)

a

set sum of 1 0 billiqn dollars for reparations .

(3) renunciation of reparations by Great Britain.
9 2Keynes , Economic Consequences , p . 160.
93 Ibid . , p . 226.
94 Ibid . , p . 150.
95Ray Stannard Bake r , Woodrow Wilson and the World Settlement .
(Gloucester , Mas s . : P . Smith, 1922) .
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(4) an agreement as to the appropriate proportion of
reparations to be guaranteed to all other parties
of the treaty .
(5) the issuance of bonds by Germany to cover the
amount of reparations . 96
Since these questions were not dealt with prior to the conference, Keynes
had a solution after the conference was over.

Several of the points are

the same but many are new to deal with the exigencies which had arisen:
(1) reparations and costs should be set at 10 billion
dollars .
(2) the surrender of merchant ships , submarine cables ,
war material, and claims against territory should
be set at 2 . 5 billion dollar s .
(3) the balance of 7 . 5 billion dollars should b e set
with no interest pending repayment . It should then
be paid in thirty installments of 250 million be
ginning in 1923.
(4) the Reparations Commission should be dissolved or
brought under the control of the League of Nations .
It should also include representatives from Germany
as well as neutral countries .
(5) Germany should meet the annual payments as she sees
fit. Complaints should be lodged with the League .
(6) no reparations should be demanded from Austria.

97

It is interesting t o note just exactly what some o f these provisions imply.

For example, suggestion number five is essentially the same thing

as the Young Plan which would come into being se�eral years later.

Num-

ber five also forbids any unilateral action against Germany such as the
French took in 1923 when they occupied the Ruhr.

Thus we can see that

while Keynes viewed the League as a moralistic device, he did believe

96Keynes, Economic Conse
quences, pp . 147-148.
9 7 Ibid . , pp . 261-262.
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that it could act as a strong force in international politic s .
Essentially Keynes was a f iI'lll believer in the idea that the f inancial problems of Europe could be solved only by magnanimity and not be
greed . 98

Probably the best testament to the significance of John May-

nard Keynes comes from Seth Tillman who wrote on Anglo-American relations at Versailles :
Had John Maynard Keynes been a member o� the
Reparations Commission, it is quite possible that
Sumner and Cunliffe would have had to pay close atten
tion to his views as a representative of the British
Treasury. Keynes ' s own analysis of the German capacity
to pay led him to the conclusion that an overall re
parations sum of $40 billion, or even $25 billion, was not
within the limits of reasonable possibility. When the
issue of the fixed sum was taken up by the Supreme Coun
cil , however , it was the views of Sumner and Cunliffe,
and not of Keynes , which influenced Lloyd George, bring
ing him into direct collision with President Wilson. 99
It

is

most interesting to note that the representatives on the Repara-

tions Commission for the British Empire were Hughes , Cunliffe, and Sumner--three who were in favor of demanding huge sums from Germany .

In-

deed how different things might have been if Keynes had been there .
In the two decades following the end of the war the problems wrought
by the reparations issue came to a head .

In this period John Maynard

Keynes was proved correct in his views of what would happen if the economic difficulties were not solved at Versailles .

It cannot be said

that the reparations issue caused the rise of Hitler but a good case can
be made to show how reparations affected his rise indirectly.
grave economic crisis hit Germany .

Inflation was rampant .

In 1923 a

At one point

98Keynes , Economic Consequence s , pp . 147-148 .
99 seth P . Tillman, Anglo-American Relations at the Paris Peace
Conference of 1919. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press ,
1961) .
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the rate of exchange reached one trillion marks to the dollar .

Repara

tions certainly did not help avoid this crisis.
With such horrible inflation, many men were put out of work.
These were the men from which Hitler recruited his forces.

Dissatisfac

tion with reparations , war guilt, and Germany ' s new government fueled
the fire which forged Hitler ' s tyrannical state.
The loans from the United States did not help matters much as they
were used to meet the reparations demands of the Allies.

It almost

seemed as if the United States was trying to make up for her oversights
at Versaille s , but it was too late.

Even though the reparations demands

were later liberalized by the Dawes and Young Plans , when the great
crash came it struck Germany especially hard .
the corner.

Hitler was just around

It is important to note that reparations had been virtually

done away with by the time of the crash and depression.

However, even

though this was the cas e , the economic difficulties inherent in the re
parations problem remained.

The damage had already been done and it

could not be reversed.
A relatively minor point but one which received some attention from
the intellectuals was the six month continuation of the blockade of Ger
many

after the armistice of 11 November and its attendant effect upon

the mood of the country .

In reality the blockade was not that bad.

It

did cause inconvenience and hard feelings among the Germans but the
claims of mass starvation were exaggerated.

The intellectuals , however ,

seized on the blockade as proof o f man ' s inhumanity t o man.

Austin

Harrison disliked the blockade because it was unfair and arbitrary.

He

believed that it would be removed only when the people let th� politi-
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cians

know

that they will not allow the enemy to be starved in the

name of the League .

Harrison saw the blockade as a reflection of the

anti-German feeling enthroned in Paris.
The thing of Paris is not gentlemanly . It enslaves
our enemies and degrades the victors . And it creates
continy8us conditions of war . Thus Armageddon ends in
farce. O
George Bernard Shaw also took up the case against the continued
blockade.

He compared Great Britain ' s use of the blockade to Napoleon ' s

turning of his cannon on the ice when he caught the Russians on a frozen
lake.

When the shooting stopped he then tried to save the drowning

Russian soldiers .

With characteristic overstatement Shaw then asked why

we were starving the children of Germany .
defeat , but for extermination?"

lOl

"Are we out , not merely for

He then went furthe r , stating that

the reparations could not be paid if the German industry was ruined and
the workers starved.

1 2
Even slaves must be fed as well as beaten. 0

Henry Noel Brailsford approached the whole punishment issue from
another angle.

He travelled in Germany after the war and wrote concern-

ing the mood of the people there .

He stated that there was a great deal

of self-guilt and hopelessness about the situation.

Even the German papers

condemned such acts as the violation of Belgium, the devastation of the
Somme, and the U-boat war. 103

In short , the Germans were sorry for their

lOOHarrison, "Covenant or Tilsit?" , p . 557.
lOlG�orge Bernard Shaw . Prefaces £l. Bernard Shaw (Long Acre, London:
Odhams Press, Ltd . , 1938) , p . 4 9 5 .
102Ibid . , p . 4 96.
1 03Henry Noel Brailsford . Across the Blockade (New York:
Brace and Howe , 1919) , pp. 115-116 .

Harcourt,
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sins and were ready to admit to some degree of guilt .

However, this

woeful mood passed with the publication of the Treaty.

The Germans

saw the terms as the Allie s ' project for the destruction of their in
dustry in order to be rid of a commercial riva1 . 104
and loss of foreign trade would ruin Germany .

Thus the indemnity

Germans would be forced

to emigrate because they would be unable to buy food from abroad.

The

problem would then become one of where could the Germans go .
Mr. Hoover has predicted that ten or twelve million
Germans will be forced to emigrate. Whither?
North
America is closed. The Argentine is legally open, and
Russia one day will be open. But shall we tolerate a
German ' penetration' of Russia? Will the ghost of
President Monroe allow Latin-America to be Germanized? 105
�his united the country under the banner of resistance to the terms .

The

rise of men like Adolph Hitler can be seen as a reflection of this resistance and a logical outgrowth of i t .
In �ummary , what occurred a t Versailles was not what Woodrow Wilson
or · the intellectuals of Great Britain had in mind.

Instead of a just

peace, what occurred was revenge and a continuation of the conditions of
war .

1 04Henry Noel Brailsford. Across the Blockade (New York:
Brace and Howe, 1919), pp . 118-119 .
l05 Ibid . , pp. 124-12 5 .

Harcourt ,

CHAPTER FOUR
The League of Nations
The League of Nations came into being as the majo r hope for maintaining peace in a troubled world.

The intellectuals of Great Britain

were essentially men of hope and vision but their disagreements concerning the League are most interesting.

While all agreed as to its

necessity , they were involved in the important questions of what the
League should do and by what means these things should be done.
The League was viewed as necessary as a means of achieving stability
and security.

Brailsford pointed out that there were two concepts of

security which were within the realm of possibility .
curity
mit

The first was se-

imposed by a force which had the ability to make the world sub-

to its will.

world which

had

The second , and more pleasant concept , involved a
purged itself of its worst elements to achieve security.

This second concept Brailsford believed was in the offing.

106

Theoretically , the only security seems to lie in some
organic international association, which, by the creation
of intimate and pervasive relationships of interdependence
within itsel f , is at least in process of evolution towards
'the ideal of international solidarity . 107
In its initial formation the League must face two tests if it is to

106a . N . Brailsford, A League of Nations (New York:
1917 ) , p . 324 .

The Macmillan Co . ,

l07R . N . Brailsford, The Covenant o f Peace: An Essay � the League of
Nations (New York: B .W:--liuebsch , 1919) , p . · 8 .
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survive .

First, the League ' s composition must be such that all memb�rs

are assured the prospect of the fair settlement of disputes , thus mak
ing war unn�cessary.

Second, if the worst does occur and war breaks

out, the League must be strong enough to gain superiority over the
warring powers.

If the League is unable to achieve superiority, it is

1 8
doomed to failure . 0
This second point was Brailsford ' s most telling one.

He saw that

the coalitions and alliances had become very strong and that their con
tinuation meant that every war would be a universal one.

Thus it would

be the task of the League to break up the alliance systems . 109

This

was the reason for the necessity of the League , according to Brailsford.
The intellectual concerned mainly with arguments for the necessity
of the League was H . G . Wells .

Re believed that the League was necessary

because war had become so destructive .

The choice was between an organi

zation of permanent peace or the progressive development of war and the
ultimate destruction of civilization.

110

Wells based his beliefs on the assumption that war by its very
nature is illimitable .

Since war is a cessation of law and order it

would be impossible to prevent the use of all means of killing .

Wells

saw that many people would not accept the fact that war could not be
limited , preferring to believe that a code of conduct or type of chivalry
could be used to impose restrictions on the making of war .

Wells count

ered this by stating that it would be easier to abolish war than to res-

1 08Brailsford, A League of Nations , p . 4 7 .
l09Brailsford , The Covenant of Peace, pp . 11-12.
llOH . G . Wells , The Idea EE_ a League of Nations (Boston, 1919) , p . 8 .
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trict it because a nation could very easily be swept along if the en�my
were not bound by the same self-imposed restrictions . 111

This very ex-

ample occur�ed during the war with the problems engendered by Germany ' s
invasion o f Belgium as well as the continued use of the submarine.

Ger-

many viewed the invasion of Belgium as a necessity in the same way she
viewed continued unrestricted submarine warfare.
same German necessities as atrocities.

The Allies saw these

The point was who was to be the

referee to determine what would be legal and what would not when the world
was at war .

More importantly, would the referee be strong enough to in-

sure that his decisions would be upheld?
Wells went even further to prove his point concerning the illimitability of war by stating the case of the Argive-Lacedaemonian s truggle
at Thyrea mentioned in Herodotus .
by a test of champions .

Here the strug�le was to be determined

The terms were that 300 �rom each. side would

battle to deteniP.ne the vi.c tor.

The armies were sent home so that they·

could not help if their side got into trouble.

The two sides were so

evenly matched that by the end of the day only three men were left, two
Argives and one Spartan.

The two Argive s , regarding themselves as vie-

tors, went home .

The Spartan stayed behind to strip the Argive dead be-

fore ' going home.

When the armies learned of the result both claimed vie-

tory, the Argives because they had more survivors , the Spartans because
they had stayed on the field to strip the dead while the enemy ran away .
The battle which both sides had sought to avoid was then fought anyway . 112
111n . G . Wells , The Idea of !. League of Natiqns (Boston, 1919 ) , pp . 1 6-18 .
112

Ibid . ,
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Thus even the concept of limitation of war had its difficulties when it
actually came to putting the plan into operation.

Again, who was to

referee in order to determine the victor when the victory is not clearcut?

Wells believed that it was possible for nations to agree not to

resort to force when they have suffered injustices, either real or imagined,

It was quite against human nature that , having appealed to force,

those nations should limit its use and accept defeat rather than cross
1
the stipulated boundaries. 13
Having stated reasons for the League ' s necessity , Wells recognized
that there were certain obj ections which could be raised against the
League.

First there was the biological objection which states that the

end of war is impossible because all life is conflict.

Man expands and

increases his control by conflict and the fittest survive .

Wells point-

ed out that life as conflict was a misconception when applied to war because war was not discriminatory.

The fittest do not survive.

Admit-

tedly this was not the case when wars were fought with spears as the
strongest did survive .

Even with the advent of firearms , alertnes s ,

alacrity, and wit could keep a man alive .

But the new modes of warfare

rained down death in an entirely haphazard manner.

Modern war involving

millions of men killed those men in a haphazard manner .
strength helped a man in those circumstances .

No amount of

In fact , the shirkers and

the parasitical members of the society profited.

114

Survival of the

fittest meant that the society would continue to prosper and grow.

With

ll3H . G . Wells , The Idea of .!. League of Nations (Boston , 1919) , pp . 24-25.
114

Ibid . , pp . 28 -29 .
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the lei� fit 1urviving the iociety could only decl ine .
Another o�jection to th� League which Well� foresaw and replied to

wa1

tho

a rgument that the meehonical and chemical advances brought about

at a re1ult of

t he

war wer e sood and neeeswary if the world

i1 t o advance.

Well1 admitted that the advances were necessary but that the cost was out
of proportion to the overall gain .

The best men,

mo 1 t intelli&en t , had died in the trenches a�

cal sainJ?
the faee

The
1aw wa1
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of

of

result of the mechanical

Welli �imply asked whence will come the great

and chemical advance s .
1cientif ic men

a

the healthiest and the

the future to coneolidate and continue the technologi

The LeaClJe thus was necessary if man wa•

to

1urvive in

hii continued gains .

final 4nd perhaps ·major objection to the League which Wells fore-

the objection from

a Leaaue and 10

there

precedent . the view that there had never been

never will be one .

The poople who beli eved this

W�l'• 1ene:ally narrow in outlook, dieliking the "international" as
pect• of o Leaaue .

Thei·r eeni e

not real patriotism but
nat ion.

11 6

3

of

pa tri ot i sm was very great but it was

dislike o! in ter fe rence in the life

of

the

Wells pointed out that nationality was not threatened by the

foi-mat!on of a League but the obsession to power was .

This obsession had

�••n built up in the ei;htecnth century by a Machiavellian spirit.

1 17

Welle believed that the world would be a much better place with the power
ob••••ion deJtreyed.

Pride and love for one ' s country could remain but

without the power obsession, both were harmless .

ll 5a . G .
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Thus Wells believed that the primary business of the Allies was the
organization of a League of peace.

The League must include Germany as

that country was the heart of Europe but Wells recognized that true re
conciliation would not be possible until the present generation died. 118
Other intellectuals agreed with Wells on the point of the inclusion
.
of Germany in the League.

George Bernard Shaw stated that the diffi-

culty in forming the League is not to get all nations into it but to
keep the incompatible ones out.

He believed that the League had to be

founded on common ideas , institutions , levels of civilization , and philosophies of life.

Without the United States, Great Britain, France , and

Germany the League could not function at all.

119

G . Lowes Dickinson did

not believe that the League was necessarily a panacea for the evils of
war but felt that Germany must be allowed into the League because it was
not' intended to be a league against Germany .

Dickinson stated that if

Germany was left out, she would intrigue to break up the League.

Thus

12
the menac� to peace would be greater with Germany outside the League. 0
Another argument in favor of German entry into the League was voiced
by Dickinson.

He pointed out that if Germany were excluded, the United

States would not join the League and that Wilson had said as much in a
22 January 1917 speech to the Senate when he stated that the League was
to be a new order, not a continuation of the old.
11 8
H . G . Wells , What Is Coming?
pp . 29 0-293 .

(New York:

The Macmillan Co . , 1916)

119G . B . Shaw, What .!.. Really Wrote About the War (New York:
1914) , p . 291.
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The question upon which the whole future peace and
policy of the world depends is this : Is the present a
struggle for a just and secure peace or only for a new
balance of power, who will guarantee, who can guarantte ,
the stable equilibrium of the new arrangement? Only a
tranquil Europe can be a stable Europe , there must be,
not a balance of power, but a connnunity of power: not
organized rivalries , but an organized common peace. 121
Wilson was speaking to an audience that was somewhat hostile to
his ideas concerning the solution of Europ e ' s problems .

The whole con-

cept of the League was based on control of the power to go to war.

Ar-

ticle ten bore the burnt of much criticism on both sides of the ocean
as it appeared to take away a nation ' s power to go to war .
The contracting powers unite in guaranteeing to
each other political independence and territorial in
tegrity against external aggression.
Henry Noel Brailsford recognized this and stated that if the League was
to work the member states must at least allow disputes to be arbitrated
before r.esorting to war.

This did not mean that states had to give up

war as a last resort or as an assertion of their own independence but
that before hostilities actually occurred there would be a moratorium
for "cooling-off" . 1 22
All of the intellectuals had ideas regarding what they felt the
League had to accomplish.

To H . G . Wells , the most important thing the

League had to do was to halt war. He stated that war had grown out of
proportion to any good which even the most complete victory could bring.
This state of affairs came about as a result of the mechanical and che-

1 2 1 G.L. Dickinson, The Choice Before Us (London:
1917 ) , pp. 260-264 .
122Brailsford, A League of Nations , pp . 295-297 .

G . Allen and Unwin ,
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mica! advances made in the name of war .

Wells used the example of the

tank to show the danger of what could happen if war was not prohibited.
The cost of a tank was very high, about forty thousand dollars ,
and the weapon itself was not yet all that useful .

Wells foresaw a

time when, unless war was prohibited, bigger and better (and necessarily
Stores of them would be

more expensive) tanks would need to be built.
needed and the cost would be enormous.

Money · for the tank program would

have to .be diverted from important social programs and in the long run
the entire society would suffer. 123
Wells ' s speculation proved surprisingly accurate in the 1930 ' s
when the naval race occurred.

More and bigger ships were built by

Japan, Great Britain, and the United States so that each �ould feel
secure against the others .

This was how the cycle began--it ended with

World War II.
Since the issue of neutrality had been one of the motivating fac
tors for World War I , the intellectuals believed that something needed
to be done about this rather useless condition.

George Bernard Shaw

believed that the entire concept of neutrality should be discarded by
the League .

Shaw felt that neutrality was absurd as it "assumes that a

country does not exist with regards to war " .

Belgium was neutral in

1914 but Germany knew she had to get to Paris quickly.

To gain passage

through Belgium, Germany offered to pay and to do no damage.

According

to Shaw, Belgium ' s refusal to Germany ' s request became an act of war by
Belgium on behalf of the Allies .

An acceptance of the request would have

123wells , The Idea of � League , pp . 9-10.
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been an act of war by Germany against the Allies .

Thus by the mere

request for passage the neutrality of Belgium collapsed. 124

Admit-

tedly Shaw ' s reasoning is a little weak on the point of Belgium ' s refusal of passage constituting an act of war unless one understands just
exactly what neutrality means .
not take sides in a war.
against attack.
in

1914 �

Neutrality means that a country will

By definition, neutrality offers no protection

Belgium was acting the role of peace-keeper in Europe

Germany could not attack France without violating Belgium un-

les� she wanted to deal with the Maginot Line.

To expect neutrality to

withstand the realistic problems wrought by war was shortsighted at
best and disasterous in the long run.
G . Lowes Dickinson also believed that neutrality should be abolished
so that no League member could refuse to take sides against a state
breaking a treaty of the League.

125

Dickinson hoped that the abolition

of neutrality would act as a deterrent to war.

If a state knew that

.
when it· broke a League treaty it would have to face all the members of
the League aligned against i t , that state might think twice before acting.
On the issue of nationality some of the intellectuals were in disagreement .

Wells believed that the League of Nations was impractical as

long as it sought to stereotype boundaries and peoples when i t was impossible to do s o .

The societies in the United States and the nations

of Europe developed quite differently and are constituted quite different124

shaw, What .!. Wrote, p .

300.

125c . L . Dickinson, Problems of International Settlement (London: Pub
lication for National Peace Council : G . Allen and Unwin , 1918) , p . xii.
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ly.

Wells saw Europe as the problem until it would stop thinking in

terms of nations and unite. 126

The League by stereotyping boundaries

only ex acerbates the problem which already exist s .
H . N . Brailsford took a different stance.

He believed that Europe

could be saved by nationalism with self-determination as the key to the
·situation.

For example , the people of Alsace were s trongly independent

and did not want to be either French or German.

They could become an

Alsatian state by being established as a neutral under the protection
of the League thus ending one of the most prominent feuds in Europe.

127

At first glance this seems to be a workable solution but problems soon
spring to mind .

This new Alsatian state was to be neutral at a time when

the concept of neutrality was under attack.

However , Alsace practically

would have to be neutral if peace was to be maintained for the Alsatian
population would contain both German and French elements .

Unless the

League was extremely strong, the most prominent feud in Europe would
not be over .
Brailsford was a true believer in self determination, feeling that
free votes should determine which way disputed areas should go with re
gards to nationality. 128

These free votes would then be accepted by the

world as the will of the people and the will of the League.
If the League was to uphold its will for the good of the world it
had to have real powe r .

Shaw felt the League must have first-rate

126wells , Salvaging of Civilization, pp. 64-65 .
127 Brailsford, A League of Nations , p . 13 5 .
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armament if it was to survive against the League of War .

129

Brailsford

believed that there was no better first-rate armament than the British
navy

and that it should be turned over to the League as its main force

against aggression.

Brailsford saw that if the British navy were left

outside the j urisdiction of the League , that body ' s decisions would bear
no weight.

130

�his is what � . G . Wells feared .

He stated that the League was in-

adequate because it had no representative sanctions , no military forces ,
and no real authority.

Wells said:

People have a way of saying it (the League) is better
than nothing . But it may be worse than nothing. It may
create a feeling of disillusiorunent about world-unifying
efforts. 131
As an example of this kind of faulty reasoning Wells. related the
story about a mad elephant in a garden.

If one wants· to be rid of the

elephant he must give the gardener an adequate weapon.

To give him a

rook-rifle. say it ' s better than nothing , and encourage him to face the
elephant is a good way to get rid of the gardener . 132

The League of

Nations without sUf ficient means of force will also fall before its own
mad elephant .
The intellectuals did not debate only what the League should do but
also what type of organization it should be.

All were not in agreement

as to the concept after which the League should be modelled .

129shaw , What .!. Wrote, p . 80.
130Brailsford, A League of Nations , pp . 200-201 .
l31well s , Salvaging E!_ Civilization, p . 14 .
132
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Bernard Shaw viewed the League as the crux of the Fourteen Points--a
group of nations constituting a trusteeship of peace.

The important

word for Shaw was nations ; the League was not to be a federation of
man.

133

Shaw was being somewhat less idealistic than some of his in-

tellectual conpatriots who saw the League as a unique achievement for
mankind--something which would promote brotherhood throughout the world.
Shaw stated that the League must not be "conceived as a Tolstoyan cele
bration� but as a very vigorous organization of resistance to evi l . 11

1 34

Shaw realized that the old dangers were still present in the world and
so relied on a strong League to wdel.d the power to keep the peace.

He

believed that the League would function best if it were organized in
much the same way as the United States ; that is , one maj or power arising
from a conglomeration of smaller states. 1 3 5

The United States had risen

from small disparate segments to become the most powerful nation in the
world .

Certainly the League could bring together disparate nations to

become the most powerful force in the world.

However , Shaw realized

that before this could be done each nation would have to put its own
house in order.

The League would be concerned primarily with interna-

tional affairs , not domestic affairs.
H . G . Wells disagreed with Shaw on this point.

the League of Nations had the ability to create
government exercising world control. 1

36
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"new world" , a world

Wells was not in favor o f the

1 33 shaw , What .!. Wrote, p . 289 .
1 34
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He believed that

1 36wells , Salvaging Ef Civilization, p . 1 5 .

67
League of Nations because of what it was inherently--a league consisting
of nations .

This , he believed, could only lead to further conflict and

ultimately war .

Wells wanted a league of mankind , a force which would

transcend national boundaries and petty obsessions .

137

The League would

then be a promoter of world-wide brotherhood and peace would be much
easier to maintain.
G . Lowes Dickinson agreed with Wells .

He stated that the League

could not and would not work unless a new spirit came over the governments and peoples .

The League was to be this new spirit but i t must not

b e allowed to become an instrument of the old power policies. 138
Wells believed that world peace could come about because of the
will for a "world law under a .world government".

This world government

would in essence ·. create a world league of men thus transcending a mere
League of Nations.

139

Wells did not feel that a mere League of Nations

wpuld work because the project of a world-wide league was a little too
much . for complete American participation and not enough to meet the
needs of Europe.

Thus the idea of a true world state, although a more
.
40
idealistic proj ect , would be a much sounder proposition. l
.

.

Wells had very definite ideas as to how this world state should be
established and what i t needed to be successful .

He realized that

national chauvinism must be contained and that patriotism mus t be en-

137wells , Salvaging � Civilization, p . 7 7 .
138G . L . Dickinson, Causes of International War (London: Swarthmore
Press , 192 0) , p . 91 .
139wells � Outline of History, pp . 583-584.
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larged to th� concept of a world state.

The common aim of world peace

would be enough to bring this unification about . 141

The best place to

start in order to release mankind from the bonds of nationalistic obsession was with the children.

The means would be a little truthful

history , something which Wells found sadly lacking in contemporary edu
cation. 142
Once all this had been achieved and war had been eradicated from
the world, the League of Nations could begin to pursue more cultural
aim s , thus producing "ennobled individuals whose city is the world 11 • 14 3
This was to b e , in Wells ' s estimation , the true role of the League .
The world awoke after the outbreak of war in 1914 to a new system of
realities antagonistic to national states.

The national quests for

power had ended in world-wide war which could truly destroy nations .
Wells believed that the case for the League of Nations rested here.
The League would achieve peace and then act as a coordinator of human
affairs. 144

Such things as war would then be impossible and man could

truly prosper and fulfill his destiny.

141Well s , Salvaging of Civilization, p . 7 1 .
142Ibid . , pp. 74-75.
14 3wells, Idea of a League, p. 4 4 .
144
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CHAPTER V
Conclusion
The intellectuals of Great Britain did not , in most cases, fit
into the same mold of thinking as their countrymen .

While most English

men were appalled by Germany ' s actions , the intellectuals , for the most
part, tried to view both sides in a logical and reasonable manner .

G.

K . Chesterton did not fit in with the other intellectuals but was im
portant because he adequately represented the views o f the average
Chesterton ' s characteristic overs tatement was more than

Englishman .

counterbalanced by the other intellectuals , most especially George
Bernard Shaw.
With the understanding of the inclusion of Chesterton as a foil ,
the similarity of views of the rest of the intellectuals becomes more
apparen t .

Shaw, Dickinson, Russell , and Wells saw neutrality a s unrealis

tic as well as foolhardy.

They held little sympathy for Belgium, viewing

her demise as a fortune of war .

Thus Germany was not to be condemned

simply for violating neutral Belgium.

The war had come about as the

result of the machinations of both sides ; thus blame could not be ap
portioned to only one side.
Both Shaw and Wells agreed concerning the importance of the tech
nological advances as they changed the essential character of war .

The

advent of the tank, the submarine , the machine-gun , and poison gas had
an overwhelming effect on the old rules of war .
69

All these weapons
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changed the essential character o f war as they were instruments o f
sudden death on a massive scale.

For example, mounting an old-style

full-scale charge with thousands of men against well-fortified machine
gun emplacements was not only foolhardy , it was disasterous .

The old

rules of war could not keep pace with the new weapons of war .
Once the war was over the real disagreements among the intellectuals
began.

Mos t of the thinkers agreed that Germany had to be included in

any post-war organization but what that organization was to accomplish
and by what means was not agreed upon.
Germany was to be included in any post-war League of Nations or she
would intrigue to break it up as the Germans could only view the League
as an alliance against them.

When it turned out that Germany was to be

punished , many voices spoke out.

Austin Harrison and George Bernard

Shaw voiced their anger over the continued Ailied blockade of Germany
after 11 November.

Henry Noel Brailsford travelled in Germany and re

por�ed on the mood of the people after the war.

He saw the dissatis

faction which unscrupulous men would capitalize on to rise to power.
Perhaps the major theme Hitler used in his rise was war-guilt but
the ramifications of Article 231, the war-guilt clause, were best ex
hibited by the issue of reparations .

John Maynard Keynes was the intel

lectual most concerned with this aspect as he sa� the dangers inherent
in wholesale reparation demands .
The main disagreements between the intellectuals arose over what
the League of Nations should be as well as what it should do .

Most intel

lectuals agreed that the League must halt war but they could not agree
on the problem of nationality .

H . G . Wells believed that nationalism was
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the bane o f the world and that if left untouched it would destroy
Europe.

H . N . Brailsford believed that a principle of nationality was

necessary if stability was to be achieved .

Thus the people of the

maj or areas of contention (i. e . , Alsac e , Danzig , etc . ) would be allowed
self-determination in order to decide their national allegiance .

It is

easy to see how this continuation of nationalism could conceivably lead
again to war if a maj or power decided to try to influence the plebiscite in an area of contention.
Regarding what the League of Nations should be H . G . Wells voiced
the opinion that the League should be a league of men as opposed to a
true League of Nations as Shaw and others wanted .

Nationality would be

superceded by a world league of men as all h�manity would be united by
the common bond of peace.
truction of future war s .

Thus i t would be possiole to escape the des
All of the intellectuals agreed that a new

war had to be avoided at all costs.

The utter destructiveness of the

war h�d had its most telling effect on the men who fought in i t .
However , the term "lost generation" applied just a s readily t o those
who were physically maimed or psychologically scarred by the violence
as it did to those eight m.illion who died as a result of the conflict.
This was what caused the intellectuals to shift from the optimism of
the first decade of the twentieth century to the pessimism of the
192 0 ' s--the terrible toll which the war took in live s , material, and
social advancement.
H . G . Wells noted in his Outline of History that hundreds of possible
Newtons , Darwins , and Bacons died unfulfilled in the trenches . 145

14 5wells, Outline � History, pp . 588-589.
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was perhaps the greatest tragedy of the war , the worst atrocity, the
greatest crime against humanity--the terrible waste of human life.
Thomas Gray penned best these sentiments in a more peaceful time in his
" Elegy" .
Here rests his head upon the lap of Earth
A youth, to Fortune and to Fame unknown;
Fair Science frown'd not on his humble birth
And Melancholy mark' d him for her own.

APPENDIX A
excerpt from
OPEN LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
(From The Nation of the 7th November 1914)
Sir I petition you to invite the Neutral Powers to confer with the
United States of America for the purpose of requesting Britain, France ,
and Germany to withdraw from the soil of Belgium and fight out their
quarrel ·on their own territorie s . However the sympathies of the neutral States may be divided , and whatever points now at issue between
the belligerent armies have no right to be in Belgium, much less to
fight in Belgium and involve the innocent inhabitants of that country
in their reciprocal slaughter. You will not question my right to ad
dress this petition to you. You are the official head of the nation
that is beyond all question chief of the Neutral Powers , marked out
by commanding magnitude , by modern democratic constitution, and by
freedom from the complication of monarchy and its traditions , which have
led Europe into the quaint absurdity of a war waged formally between the
German Kaise r , the German Tsar, the German King of the Belgians ,
the German King of England , the German Emperor of Austria, and a gentle
man who . shares with you the distinction of not being related to any of
them, and is therefore describable monarchially as one Poincare, a
Frenchman
Now that this mischief has been done , and the two European thunder
clouds have met and are discharging their lightnings , it is not for me
to meddle with the question whether the United States should take a side
in their warfare as far as it concerns themselves alone. But I may
plead for a perfectly innocent neutral State, the State of Belgium, which
is being ravaged in a horrible manner by the belligerents . Her surviving
population is flying into all the neighboring countries to escape from
the incessant hail of shrapnel and howitzer shells from British cannon,
French cannon, German Cannon, and , most tragic of all, the Belgian can
non; for the Belgian army is being forced to devas tate its own country in
its own defence.
For this there can be. no excuse; and at such a horror the rest of
the world cannot look on in silence without incurring the guilt of the
bystander who witnesses a crime without even giving the alarm. I grant
that Belgium, in her extreme peril, made one mistake . She called to her
aid the Powers of the Entente alone instead of calling on the whole world
of kindly men. She should have called on America, too; and it is hard to
see how you could in honor have disregarded. that call. But if Belgium
says nothing , but only turns her eyes dumbly towards you whilst you
look at the red ruin into which her villages , her heaps of slain, her
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monuments and treasure s , are being hurled by her friends and enemies
alike, are you any the less bound to speak out than if Belgium had asked
you to lend her a million soldiers?
I am thinking of other things :
of the honest Belgians , whom I have seen nursing their wounds , and whom
I recognize at a glance as plain men, innocent of all warlike intentions ,
trusting to the wisdom and honesty of the rulers and diplomatists who
have betrayed them, taken from their farms and their businesses to des
troy and be destroyed for no goodp.irpose that might not have been achie
ved better and sooner by neighborly means . I am thinking of the authentic
news that no papers dare publish, not of the lies they all publish to
divert your attention from the truth . In America these things can be
said without driving American mothers and wives mad : here, we have to
set our ;eeth and go forward . We cannot be j u s t : we cannot see beyond
the range of our guns . The roar of the shrapnel deafens us ; the black
smoke of the howitzer blinds our imagination s . For justice, we must do
as the medieval cities did: call in a s tranger . You are not altogether
that to u s ; but you can look at all of us impartially. And you are the
sp okesman of Western Democracy . That is why I appeal to you.
_
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